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Summary
The factors that shape French foreign policy have changed since the end of the
Cold War.  The perspectives of France and the United States have diverged in some
cases. More core interests remain similar. Both countries’ governments have
embraced the opportunity to build stability in Europe through an expanded European
Union and NATO.  Each has recognized that terrorism and the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction are the most important threats to their security today.
Several factors shape French foreign policy.  France has a self-identity that calls
for efforts to spread French values and views, many rooted in democracy and human
rights. France prefers to engage international issues in a multilateral framework,
above all through the European Union.  European efforts to form an EU security
policy potentially independent of NATO emerged in this context.
From the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States through the Iraq war
of 2003 until today, France has pressed the United States to confront emerging crises
within a multilateral framework.  France normally wishes to “legitimize” actions
ranging from economic sanctions to political censure to military action in the United
Nations.  Bush Administration officials have at times reacted with hostility to such
efforts, charging that French efforts to ensure “multipolarity” in the world are a
euphemism for organizing opposition to U.S. initiatives.
Trade and investment ties between the United States and France are extensive,
and provide each government a large stake in the vitality and openness of their
respective economies.  Through trade in goods and services, and, most importantly,
through foreign direct investment, the economies of France and the United States
have become increasingly integrated.
Other areas of complementarity include the Balkans peace operations, the
stabilization of Afghanistan, and the fight against terrorism — all challenges where
France has played a central role. A major split occurred over Iraq, however, with
many countries either supporting or independently sharing French ideas of greater
international involvement.
Developments in the Middle East affect French foreign and domestic policy.
France has a long history of involvement in the region, and a population of 5-6
million Muslims.  Paris believes that resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict is key to
bringing peace to the region and that the United States too strongly favors the Israeli
government, a U.S. tendency that impedes peace, in the French view.  Surges in
violence in the Middle East have led to anti-Semitic acts in France, mostly
undertaken by young Muslims.
This report will be updated as needed.  See also its companion report, CRS
Report RL32459, U.S.-French Commercial Ties, by Raymond J. Ahearn.
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France: Factors Shaping Foreign Policy,
and Issues in U.S.-French Relations
Introduction
The end of the Cold War has altered the U.S.-French relationship.  Before the
collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States, France, and their NATO allies
viewed the USSR as the principal threat to security.  France was known for its
independent streak in policy-making, both with its European counterparts and the
United States, notably under President de Gaulle in the 1960s.  Nonetheless, there
was cohesion throughout the alliance at such moments as the Berlin crisis of 1961,
the Cuban missile crisis the following year, and the debate over basing
“Euromissiles” in the 1980s.
Several factors shape French foreign policy that may be of interest during the
second session of the 109th Congress.  France has a self-identity that calls for efforts
to spread French values and views, many rooted in democracy and human rights.
France prefers to engage most international issues in a multilateral framework, above
all through the European Union (EU).  France is also a highly secular society, a
characteristic that influences views on the state’s relation to religion.
Since the conclusion of the Cold War, the perspectives of France and the United
States have diverged in some cases. Most core interests remain similar. Both
countries’ governments  have embraced the opportunity to build stability in Europe
through an expanded European Union (EU) and NATO.  Each has accepted the need
to ensure that Russia remain constructively engaged in European affairs.  Each has
also recognized that terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
are the most important threats today.
Post-Cold War developments have brought new challenges, which have affected
the U.S.-French bilateral relationship.  German unification and the entry of central
European states into the EU and NATO may have shifted the continent’s balance of
political and economic power away from the French-German “engine” and towards
central and eastern Europe.  While French-German initiatives remain of great
importance in Europe, German perspectives are increasingly eastward; and, in some
eyes, central European states feel closer strategically and politically to the United
States than they do to France.  Nonetheless, France remains a key player in European
affairs and few initiatives can succeed without its support and participation.
The United States, a global superpower since the Second World War, has
remained deeply involved in European affairs.  In the view of some Europeans,
however, by the mid-1990s Washington appeared to be slowly disengaging from
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Europe, while wanting at the same time to maintain leadership on the continent.1
French and German, and some would say British, efforts to form an EU security
policy potentially independent of NATO and the United States emerged and evolved
in this period.  The Europeans based this policy in part on the belief that the United
States had growing priorities beyond Europe, and in part because Americans and
Europeans were choosing different means to protect their interests.  The U.S.
decision to go into Afghanistan in October 2001 with initially minimal allied
assistance was one example of this trend; the U.S. war against Iraq, with overt
opposition from France and several other allies, was another.
During the Bush Administration, France, with other European allies, has pressed
the United States to confront emerging crises within a multilateral framework.
Terrorism and proliferation are threats that cross borders, and often involve non-state
actors.  France, where possible, normally attempts to engage elements of the
international community in responding to such threats, and to “legitimize” actions
ranging from economic sanctions to political censure to military action at the United
Nations.  In the view of many U.N. officials, the United States has disparaged the
United Nations, and is impatient with its decision-making process.2 France has
promoted a view of a “multipolar” world, with the EU and other institutions
representing poles that encourage economic development, political stability, and
policies at times at odds with the United States.  Bush Administration officials have
reacted with hostility to such efforts, charging that “multipolar” is a euphemism for
organizing opposition to U.S. initiatives.
Some U.S. observers characterize France as an antagonist.  The current French
ambassador reportedly has charged that some U.S. officials have deliberately spread
“lies and disinformation” about French policies in order to undercut Paris.3
Occasional mutual antagonism was already evident during the first years of the Fifth
Republic (1958-present), when President de Gaulle sometimes offered singular views
on international affairs, often at odds with Washington and other allies, and in 1966
withdrew France from the military structures of NATO.  In the 1960s, France began
to develop its own nuclear deterrent force.
French assertiveness is generally seen in a different, more constructive, light in
Europe.  Other Europeans often credit French initiatives in the EU and in other
institutions as fresh in perspective, or moving a discussion into a new realm; Paris
played a major role, for example, in the conception and implementation of the EU’s
Economic Monetary Union (EMU).
Traditional French assertiveness accounts in some ways for France punching
above its weight on the international scene.  France is a country of medium size with
modest resources. Yet it has played a persistent role, for example, in establishing
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EMU, building a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), and in orchestrating
opposition to the U.S.-led Iraq war. While U.S.-French relations have at times been
contentious, there is also a  complementarity and an intertwining of U.S. and French
interests and actions.  Nowhere is this more clear than in the realm of commercial
interactions.
Trade and investment ties between the countries are extensive, providing each
side a big stake in the vitality and openness of their respective economies.  Through
trade in goods and services, and, most importantly, through foreign direct investment,
the economies of France and the United States have become increasingly integrated.
Over $1 billion in commercial transactions take place every business day of the year
between the two sides.  This huge amount of business activity, in turn, is responsible
for creating an estimated 1.7 million American and French jobs.4 
Other areas of complementarity include the Balkans peace operations, the
stabilization of Afghanistan, and the fight against terrorism — all challenges where
France has played a central role.  A major split occurred over Iraq, however, with
many countries either supporting or independently sharing French ideas of greater
international involvement.  
This report examines the key factors that shape French foreign policy.  From
that context, it analyzes some of the reasons for the tensions in and the
accomplishments of U.S.-French relations. The report is illustrative, rather than
exhaustive.  Several important issues, such as the effort to stabilize Haiti and the
policy to persuade Iran to open its nuclear program to international inspections, are
not examined.  Instead, the report reviews other issues selected because they
exemplify some of the essential features of the U.S.-French relationship.
Factors Shaping French Policy
A Global Perspective
France, like the United States, believes that it has a special role in the world.
The core of the perceptions of France’s role in the world stems from the Revolution
that began in 1789.  The Revolution was an event of broad popular involvement:
widespread bloodshed, expropriation of property, and execution of the king fed the
notion that there could be no turning back to monarchical government.  Not only was
the monarchy overthrown and a powerful church structure forcibly dismantled, but
French armies, and ultimately French administrators in their wake, transformed much
of the continent into societies where more representative, democratic institutions and
the rule of law could ultimately take root.  The Revolution was therefore a central,
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clash?,” International Journal, vol. LIX, no. 1,  winter 2003-2004.
formative element in modern European history, notably in Europe’s evolution from
monarchical to democratic institutions.  The cultural achievements of France before
and since the Revolution have added to French influence.  French became the
language of the élite in many European countries.  By 1900, French political figures
of the left and the right shared the opinion that France was and must continue to be
a civilizing beacon for the rest of the world.5
The view that France has a “civilizing mission” (la mission civilisatrice) in the
world endures today.  For many years, the French government has emphasized the
message of human rights and democracy, particularly in the developing world and in
central Europe and Eurasia.
Many French officials, particularly Gaullists,6 have been highly assertive in
seeking to spread French values throughout the world.  Prime Minister Dominique
de Villepin, has written that “at the heart of our national identity, there is a permanent
search for values that might be shared by others.”  Gaullists have sought to embed
French views in EU initiatives, sometimes in concert with Germany and sometimes
alone.  In 1996, the former Gaullist Prime Minister Alain Juppé called for an “inner
circle” in the EU, defined as “a small number of states around France and Germany”
that must move forward to secure EMU, a common foreign and security policy, and
a military force able to protect the Union’s interests. His foreign minister added that
such policies, “far from weakening France’s influence and authority in the world...
will increase their impact and audience.”7  France’s rank and influence in the world
are important to French policymakers.  Membership on the U.N. Security Council,
close relations with parts of the Arab world and former worldwide colonies, aspects
of power such as nuclear weapons, and evocation of human rights are central to
France’s self-identity in international affairs.8
Others sometimes contest France’s evocation of values.  By the mid-20th
century, some French colonies, such as Algeria and Morocco, sharply disputed
whether actual French policy met the ideals of Paris’s message.  Algeria fought a
twenty-year war for independence. Today, some Europeans praise the intellectual
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underpinnings of French “reason and good sense” that combat “prejudice and
fanaticism.” However, they see occasional contradictions in French policy, as when
France sought to lift sanctions against Iraq when U.N. WMD inspections temporarily
ended there in 1998, then only belatedly accepted a new inspections regime in 2002,
even though French officials had privately been stating their belief that Iraqi WMD
programs were likely continuing, or when France balks at what some view as more
democratic power-sharing in the expanding European Union.9
The European Union
France was one of the founding members of the European Union (initially
known as the European Coal and Steel Community) in 1952.  Improved trade and
economic development were central objectives of member states in a Europe still
struggling from the dislocation caused by the Second World War, but overarching
objectives from the beginning were political rapprochement between Germany and
its former enemies, and political stability on the continent.  The EU was conceived
in this context, with strong U.S. support.
France has been a catalyst in achieving greater political unity and economic
strength in the European Union.  President Chirac has altered the traditional Gaullist
view that France could act alone as a global power and be the Union’s most
important member.  Rather, today, the Gaullists believe that France can best exert its
power through the EU, acting in tandem with Germany and occasionally with Britain.
At the same time, the defeat of a referendum in spring 2005 endorsing an EU
“constitution” meant to make EU decision-making more effective may be a sign of
popular doubts about the direction and strength of the Union.
Some European governments object to the view that France, Germany, and
Britain can guide EU policies.  They describe the claim for leadership of the three
countries as a nascent  “Directoire,” or initiative to dominate the EU and push
smaller member states to follow the three governments’ lead.  French officials
dispute the idea of a “Directoire.”  In their view, initiatives in the Union should not
be held back by governments that wish to proceed more slowly.  President Chirac
describes the efforts of France and Germany, and occasionally Britain, as those of a
“pioneer group” that wishes “to go faster and further in European integration.”  Some
French officials say that France “does not wish to be resigned to a Europe which
would only be a space of internal peace.”  Rather, in their view the EU should
become a force for positive, broad-reaching change in Europe and the world.10
French officials cite a range of examples where a “pioneer group” of EU
countries has taken the lead in forging forward-looking policies.  France, Germany,
and other countries led the way in implementing the Schengen agreement (open
borders for people) and EMU, which not all EU countries have embraced.  In 2003
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and 2004, France, Germany, and Britain played the key role in persuading Iran to
accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections of its nuclear energy
sites for possible evidence of nuclear weapons production.  French officials state that
they want the EU to have a strong Commission and a strong President of the
Commission, although the Council, where ministers from member states meet, must
remain paramount in decision-making.  France has supported initiatives to streamline
voting in the EU, and to place more areas of decision-making under “qualified
majority voting (QMV),” to avoid a rule under which one government among the 25
member states may veto a decision. For example, France has proposed,
unsuccessfully, that  foreign-policy decisions be subject to QMV.11
French efforts to provide leadership in the EU have occasionally led to
contentious disputes with other governments, which sometimes involve the United
States.  After 15 EU member or candidate states signed two letters in February 2003
backing U.S. policy towards Iraq, President Chirac said that the EU aspirants were
“not terribly well-behaved and a little unaware of the dangers that a too rapid
alignment with the American position can carry.”  They lost a good opportunity “to
be quiet;” Chirac then appeared to threaten to veto Romania’s and Bulgaria’s
candidacies for membership.  Officials from Poland and several other governments
that signed the letter sharply criticized Chirac for such comments, and cited the
remark as evidence that France wished to dominate the Union and was cool towards
EU enlargement.  Such instances act to undercut France’s leadership in the EU.12
Officials in some EU governments believe that France’s leadership is
constrained by policies occasionally viewed as erratic.  In one example, France, with
Germany, was a principal progenitor of EMU, conceived to bind the EU economies
more closely together by subjecting them to legal strictures over debt and a range of
monetary policies.  France initially described EMU as above all a political measure,
in which EU member states agreed upon joint economic policies for the good of all.
When France (and Germany) decided to abrogate the “Stability Pact” governing these
policies in late 2003, some member states complained that Paris was acting in its own
political interest, at the expense of others.13 In this view, France had initially
persuaded other governments to embrace EMU as a turning point for the Union, but
at a moment when its economy was experiencing difficulties decided to walk away
from a key element of the policy.
At the same time, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s description in 2003 of
Europe as divided between “old” (France, and other governments that criticized the
Administration’s policy towards Iraq) and “new” (those governments that supported
Administration policy) has not been well-received in central Europe. While these
governments may at times spurn French leadership, and desire a strong strategic
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partnership with the United States, they nonetheless view EU membership and the
continental stability that it may bring as an equally vital interest.  These governments
believe that they must work closely with France to shape EU political and economic
policy, and oppose any Administration efforts to divide the European Union.14
Multilateralism
Multilateralism is important to all U.S. allies and in particular to all 25 members
of the European Union, which is itself a multilateral entity painfully put together over
a fifty-year period.  For the Europeans, decision-making in international institutions
can lend legitimacy to governmental policies.  Member states of the EU share certain
attributes of sovereignty and pursue joint policies intended to provide political and
economic stability, goals that the United States has supported since the 1950s.
Globally, Europeans perceive the U.N. as the locus for decision-making that can
provide an international imprimatur for member states’ actions in international
security.  The U.N. carries special significance for European governments that
experienced two world wars.  Europeans see the EU and the U.N. as belonging to a
civilizing evolution towards cooperation rather than confrontation in world affairs.
France is in a key position in the framework of multilateral institutions.  It
enjoys a permanent seat and holds a veto in the U.N. Security Council.  Important EU
policies are not possible without French support.  French officials play central roles
on the European Commission, in the European Central Bank, and the IMF, and are
eligible to lead, and have led, each of these institutions.
France wishes to confront the greatest threats to its security through
international institutions. The Chirac government identifies terrorism as the country’s
most important threat.  France has considerable experience in combating terrorism
and today is generally regarded as highly effective in that domain.  At the same time,
France believes that an anti-terror foreign policy must include a comprehensive
multilateral effort to diminish the prevalence of poverty in the developing world and
to encourage the spread of literacy, democracy, and human rights.  While military
action may also be a tool against terrorism for Paris, French leaders prefer to begin
any effort to confront an international threat in a multilateral framework.
The Use of Force and the United Nations
For the French government, the conflict in Iraq in 2003 raised questions about
the legitimate use of force.  France, together with several other European
governments, have been critical of the Bush Administration’s national security
doctrine that endorses “preemptive action” in the face of imminent danger.
While the French government does not reject the use of force, it maintains that
certain criteria must be met for military action to acquire legitimacy.  In the words
of Prime Minister de Villepin, fear of terrorism and other threats make “the use of
force...  tempting.  [Use of force] is justifiable if collective security or a humanitarian
crisis requires it.  But it should only be a last recourse, when all other solutions are
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exhausted and the international community, through the Security Council, decides
upon the question.” In a speech to the U.N. General Assembly in clear reference to
the U.S. invasion of Iraq, President Chirac said, “In today’s world, no one can act
alone in the name of all and no one can accept the anarchy of a society without rules.
There is no alternative to the United Nations.... Multilateralism is essential....  It is
the [U.N. Security Council] that must set the bounds for the use of force.  No one can
appropriate the right to use it unilaterally and preventively.”15
For the most part, France’s record over the past decade has been consistent in
following the precept that the U.N. must endorse the use of force in a crisis.  For
example, France, along with other countries, since 1990 has obtained a U.N.
resolution for the potential or actual use of force for interventions in the first Gulf
War, Bosnia, Afghanistan, Congo, the Ivory Coast, and Haiti.  One notable exception
came in 1999, when France joined its NATO allies in going to war against Serbia in
an effort to prevent ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.  In that case, until the eleventh hour,
the French government sought a U.N. resolution for NATO’s use of force.  At the
same time, in the face of an increasingly likely Russian veto, French officials and
counterparts from several other European allies began indicating that Serbian actions
had reached a stage where using force to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe in
Kosovo would be justifiable without a U.N. resolution.16 When a Russian veto
became certain, there was a consensus in NATO that the use of force was justifiable
in this instance even in the absence of a U.N. resolution.
“Multipolarity”
France and the United States have clashed over Paris’s pursuit of “multipolarity”
in economic, military, and political affairs.  The French government describes
multipolarity as a system of balance in international affairs, in part a natural
outgrowth of trading blocs and regional global differences, in part a value that is in
principled opposition to global domination by one power or bloc. Some U.S.
officials, notably Condoleezza Rice, disparage the concept as a means to thwart U.S.
foreign policy.  In June 2003, she said that it was troubling that “some have spoken
admiringly — almost nostalgically — of ‘multipolarity,’ as if it were a good thing to
be desired for its own sake.” She said that France seemed intent upon “checking” the
United States and that Paris appeared to consider “the United States more dangerous
than Saddam Hussein.”17  Some Administration supporters in the neo-conservative
movement are more pointed and claim that France wishes to reclaim the “grandeur”
CRS-9
18 See Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment Revisited,” National Interest, winter
2002/2003; “France may pose long-term challenge to U.S. defense policy, Perle says,”
Aerospace Daily, Feb. 13, 2003, p. 4-5.
19 Anand Menon, France, NATO and the Limits of Independence, 1981-1997: The Politics
of Ambivalence (New York, St. Martin’s Press, 2000), p. 69-70.
20  “New year, old theme: Chirac elbows Bush,” New York Times, Jan. 10-11, 2004; De
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(continued...)
of an earlier era and deny the United States its “unipolar moment”; in this view,
multipolarity is a concept employed specifically to subvert U.S. foreign policy.18
The idea of multipolarity is not new, nor is it French in origin.  In recent times,
it was a common sentiment in the European Union of the 1990s.  It was seen at that
time as a means for Europeans, acting together, to put forward their commercial
interests in negotiations and reach equitable trade agreements with the United
States.19  French officials have usually tended to describe multipolarity as taking
effect across a range of policies.  They say that the world is “unipolar” in a military
sense, given the U.S.’s overwhelming military power.  But they also note that given
the proliferation of crises around the globe, the development by the EU of military
institutions and units can provide complementary forces in the effort to build order
and stability.  Chirac has used “multipolarity” in economic terms as well, noting that
not only the EU but the rise of China, India, and Mercosur in Latin America have
created global commercial competitors.  De Villepin contends that “the vision of
multipolarity aims in no case to organize rivalry or competition, but rather
responsibility, stability, and initiative.”20  As will be discussed below, some U.S.
officials believe that French-led EU initiatives are intended to undercut elements of
U.S. leadership of NATO.
Religion and the State: “Le Foulard”
France has a long history of religious violence.  Political factions went to war
in the 16th century over religious differences and dynastic claims; the conflict left
many thousands dead and the society badly divided.  One cause of the Revolution
was a desire by many to end the Catholic Church’s grip on elements of society and
dismantle a church hierarchy widely viewed as corrupt and poorly educated.  
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the government sought to ensure that
public schools did not become embroiled in religious controversies.  Parliament
passed a law in 1905 intended to ensure separation between religion and politics. The
law enshrined “laïcité” as a principle of French life.  “Laïcité” is not simply
secularism, but rather an attempt to balance religious freedom and public order. The
government protects freedom of religion, and there is no state church in France; at
the same time, there is an effort to ensure that religious groups do not engage in
political activism that would be disruptive of public life.21
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A current controversy in France has pitted elements of the Muslim community
against the government.  Approximately 36% of France’s Muslim community
describe themselves as “practicing.”22  Within this group are Muslims who seek to
ensure that their children may pursue what they view as traditional Islamic practices
in France’s public school system. Some French Muslim families require their girls
to wear head scarves (“le foulard”) to school.  French public schools are co-
educational.  Some Muslim families object to elements of co-education; for example,
they do not want their female children to take physical education, nor do they want
them to take biology classes where reproduction is discussed.  Some families also do
not want male doctors to treat their female children at public hospitals.  The French
government believes that such families are causing disruption in the public school
system, especially in a period of increased tensions between Muslims and Jews in
France, and a period of political tensions with the Muslim world over the issue of
terrorism.
After an extended debate, the government presented a bill to Parliament to ban
“conspicuous” religious symbols in schools through secondary-school level.  The law
prohibits the wearing of head scarves; it also bans religious symbols such as large
crosses and the yarmulke.  In the parliamentary debate over the bill, then Prime
Minister Raffarin said that the purpose of the legislation is “to set limits” in the face
of growing religious militancy. Some religious signs “take on a political sense and
cannot be considered a religious sign,” he said.  “I say emphatically, religion must not
be a political subject.”23 Some Muslim governments, such as that of Iran, sharply
condemned the bill.  Moderate Muslim groups in France supported it as a means to
reduce tensions in the school system and in broader society.24 The bill passed by a
wide margin in March 2004, with government parties and elements of the left
supporting it.
Some observers in France criticized the bill because they viewed it as essentially
a negative instrument. In this view, the government should do more to integrate
Muslims into French society.  The debate evokes a familiar theme in recent French
history. At the turn of the 20th century, for example, many opposed the large
migration into France of Italians and Spaniards, ethnic groups viewed as coming
from societies where political violence was rife.  Yet these groups have become well
assimilated into French society, their members commonly occupying senior positions
in politics and the professions.  In contrast, many observers in France believe that
large elements of the Muslim population have not been assimilated.  One observer,
a member of the government-appointed commission to study the issue of head
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scarves in schools, opposed the law.  In his view, France should seek a balance that
embraces diversity yet preserves a degree of uniformity that sustains the French
“identity.” He believes that the law unfairly stigmatizes the Muslim population.25
In late October 2005, riots broke out in the suburbs surrounding Paris, Lyons,
Toulouse, Lille, and other cities.  For the most part, these are working class suburbs
populated by North Africans; unemployment levels are high, and educational levels
are low.  In many ways, these suburbs are a society apart, their inhabitants cut off
from most of the opportunities afforded French youth who are not Muslim.  The
rioting has largely taken the form of violence against property.  The government
declared a state of emergency and responded with curfews and with police, who cut
off the neighborhoods from the nearby cities.26
Anti-Semitism in France.  Since 2000, there has been a noticeable increase
in anti-Semitic acts of violence in France.  Most of the acts have occurred in the
suburbs around Paris, and in southern cities such as Marseille and Montpellier.
Molotov cocktails have been thrown at several synagogues and schools, rabbis have
been assaulted, and in one instance, a school bus with Jewish children was stopped
and threatened by a gang of street thugs.  No one has been killed in these attacks.27
France has a total population of 59.8 million, of whom approximately 600,000
are Jewish.  According to a 2002 study by a French Jewish community organization,
most French Jews today are white collar professionals, and are well integrated into
French society.  “Mixed” marriages with non-Jews have become increasingly
common in the past two decades, but a strong community sense remains.  In a 2002
poll, 42% of the Jewish population said that they keep kosher, while 29% said that
they are non-observant.  Since the increase in 2000 in anti-Semitic incidents, 6%,
mostly young Jews in their teens and twenties, responded that they have thought
about moving to Israel (the figure was 3% in a 1988 poll); at the same time 58% said
that they had not thought of moving to Israel (an increase from 40% in 1988.)28
In France, there is broad agreement that most anti-Semitic acts have been
committed by young North African Muslims. However, there is also concern that
non-Muslims are increasingly engaged in anti-Semitic violence. Over the past
decade, there has been a close correlation between surges in violence in the Middle
East and increases in anti-Semitic acts in France.  The Gulf War of 1991, the
Palestinian Intifada since fall 2000, and Israeli military action on the West Bank and
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The history of Jews in France is replete with important political milestones and
a strong measure of controversy.  In 1791, during the Revolution, France was the first
European country to extend citizenship to its Jewish population.  There have been
three Jewish prime ministers (Léon Blum in 1936-1937, Pierre Mendès-France in
1954-1955, and Laurent Fabius in 1984-1986).  Blum was asked by General de
Gaulle to head a post-war provisional government in 1946 (he declined due to ill
health).  French Jews hold senior positions in government, business, and academics.
Some American commentators have responded to the acts of anti-Semitic
violence in France by charging that the country as a whole is anti-Semitic.  They see
a continuity among the Dreyfus trials of the 1890s, in which a French Jewish military
officer was wrongly convicted of espionage due to anti-Semitic sentiments in the
government and the army, the Vichy regime of 1942-1944, which collaborated with
the Nazis and sent French Jews to their deaths in concentration camps, and the anti-
Semitic violence that increased after 2000.  They describe the strong showing of
Jean-Marie Le Pen (17.85%), in the past convicted of anti-Semitic crimes by French
courts, in the 2002 presidential elections as evidence that the French population
retains strong anti-Semitic sentiments.30  Israeli officials have charged that the French
government’s Middle East policies create an atmosphere where anti-Semitism can
grow.  One right-wing extremist Jewish group (Hérout) contends that the French
government is “pro-Arab” and anti-Semitic.  Some prominent French Jews intimate
that the French government’s criticism of Israel is a cloak for anti-Semitism.31
Other views contest the assertion that France is an anti-Semitic country.  Charles
Haddad, the president of Marseille’s Jewish Council, has said, for example, that
“This is not anti-Semitic violence; it’s the Middle East conflict that’s playing out
here.”  Most politically moderate Jewish groups, led by the Representative Council
of French Jewish Organizations (CRIF), have stated that they do not regard the
general French population as anti-Semitic.  They have also commended the French
government for passing a strong law (the Lellouche Law) in December 2002 that
cracks down on anti-Semitic violence and other racist crimes. There is no evidence
that members of President Chirac’s government have anti-Semitic views.  President
Chirac and other members of his government have vigorously condemned anti-
Semitism, and held a number of public events criticizing such acts.  David Harris, the
executive director of the American Jewish Committee, has commended the French
government for its efforts.32
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Issues in U.S.-French Relations
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)
In the 1990s, the EU began to implement a Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP) to express common goals and interests on selected issues and to
strengthen its influence in world affairs.  Since 1999, with France playing a key role,
the EU has attempted to develop a defense identity outside NATO to provide military
muscle to CFSP.  The European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) is the project
that gives shape to this effort. Under ESDP, the EU is creating a rapid reaction force
of 60,000 troops and institutional links to NATO to prevent duplication of
resources.33 Since January 2003, the EU has launched several police and military
missions under ESDP in the Balkans, and led a small international peacekeeping
mission in the Congo, which France headed.
Recently, France and Germany, with some support from Britain, have sought to
enhance EU decision-making bodies and a planning staff for EU military forces
under ESDP.  The Bush Administration opposed elements of this effort, particularly
the proposal for a planning staff, as duplicative of NATO structures and a waste of
resources.  Some U.S. officials believe that France has actively sought to undermine
NATO and to reduce U.S. influence in Europe by strengthening ESDP.  French
officials strongly deny such allegations.  On December 12, 2003, NATO and the EU
reached a compromise.  There will be two planning staffs, with officers from EU
states forming an EU planning cell at NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied
Command Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium, and NATO officers will be attached
to a new, separate EU planning cell.  U.S. officials continue to express concern that
the EU planning cell, although small, will grow in time to compete with the NATO
planning staff.  The EU-NATO agreement reaffirms elements of an existing
arrangement (called “Berlin Plus”), under which the EU will consider undertaking
operations only if NATO as a whole has decided not to be engaged.  If NATO is
engaged, then the EU will not seek to duplicate NATO’s operational planning
capabilities.34  The arrangement is intended to meet the U.S. concern that there not
be two existing, and potentially competing, plans for an operation.
French officials respond to U.S. criticisms of ESDP in part by saying that the
project does not compete with NATO.  In the French view, there are too many crises
and a shortage of capable forces in Europe and the United States to manage them.
French and other European officials buttress this argument by noting the apparent
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shortage of forces for simultaneous stability operations in Afghanistan, the Balkans,
and Iraq.  U.S. officials concede that France and Britain are the only two NATO
allies with flexible combat forces able to travel long distances and sustain
themselves.  EU defense ministers, under a plan offered by France, Britain, and
Germany, agreed in April 2004 to create up to nine “battle groups” of 1,500 troops
each to act as “insertion forces” in the beginning stages of a crisis.  Under this plan,
the forces would also be available to NATO.  If brought to fruition, the battle groups
would be in action within 15 days of a decision to use them, and could sustain
themselves for four months before a larger force replaces them.35
ESDP remains a work in progress. The EU includes several self-described
“neutral” governments that do not have a strong interest in European defense
structures.  In addition, a number of governments, including several central European
governments that joined the EU in May 2004, remains close to the United States and
views NATO as central to their strategic interests; for the foreseeable future, these
governments are unlikely to follow any effort by an EU member to distance EU
defense from NATO and Washington.36
NATO
France joined NATO as an original member in 1949.  During the early years of
the Fifth Republic, President de Gaulle had a number of disputes with the United
States, in part over policies, in part over the small number of Europeans in senior
allied command positions.  France withdrew from NATO’s integrated command
structure in 1966, but has retained a seat on the North Atlantic Council (NAC), the
alliance’s political decision-making body.  Although absent from the command
structure, France participates in a range of NATO military operations.  There appears
to be a consensus that U.S.-French military relations are excellent, despite much
publicized differences between Washington and Paris on political issues.
Several factors in the 1990s contributed to renewed French doubts about NATO.
Some French officials did not want the United States exercising strong leadership in
the alliance when Washington appeared to be giving Europe diminished priority after
the Cold War.  U.S. positions on involvement in the Balkan conflicts of the early
1990s led some French and other European officials to question the alliance’s
efficacy, given that Europeans saw the Balkan wars as a major threat to security.37
The United States eventually engaged its forces in the Balkans in several NATO
operations, including in the Kosovo conflict in 1999.
France has approximately 4,000 soldiers engaged in NATO stabilization
operations in Bosnia (SFOR) and Kosovo (KFOR). In December 2004, an EU force
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succeeded the NATO stabilization force in Bosnia.  France continues to play a role
in the EU mission.
French officials recognize that military self-sufficiency in an era of global
threats is not possible, and that EU defense efforts may eventually have a regional but
not world-wide reach.  Put simply, France and the EU lack the military resources to
resolve major crises on their own.  For these reasons, France in the last several years
has become more engaged in NATO operations.  For many years, French
governments had opposed proposals for NATO “out-of-area” operations, meaning
military operations outside the Treaty area in Europe, as well as operations beyond
Europe.  The crises in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, requiring a large military
capacity to bring stability, and the September 11 attacks, requiring a military force
able to sustain combat operations in a distant theater, altered French thinking.
Chirac, reflecting on these developments, has said, “You have to be realistic in a
changing world.  We have updated our vision, which once held that NATO had
geographic limits.  The idea of a regional NATO no longer exists, as the alliance’s
involvement in Afghanistan demonstrates.”38
Nonetheless, occasional sharp differences in NATO between Paris and
Washington continue to emerge at the political level.  For example, in February 2003,
France (and Germany) sought to block a U.S. effort in the NAC to discuss sending
NATO forces to defend Turkey in the event that the impending conflict in Iraq might
spur Baghdad to strike Turkey.  Paris and Berlin contended that sending forces and
equipment to Turkey would amount to tacit approval of a U.S. decision to go to war,
and would be a provocative act.  France, and several other allies, wished instead to
continue U.N. WMD weapons inspections in Iraq (discussed more fully below).  
The Bush Administration reacted angrily to France’s efforts in the NAC.  In
April 2003, Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz told the Senate Armed Services
Committee that France had “created a big problem” in NATO over aid to Turkey.
He would later announce the Pentagon’s decision to exclude companies from France
and other countries opposing the Iraq war from contracts to rebuild Iraq.  Richard
Perle, part of the neo-conservative movement and an advisor to the Pentagon, said,
“France is no longer the ally it once was.” The following month, some Senators
suggested altering the NATO decision-making process to curtail France’s voice.39 
Some French officials counter that the Administration is pursuing policies that
undermine the alliance and divide the Europeans.  They criticize the Administration
view that “the mission drives the coalition,” contending that such an attitude erodes
the long-held position that all member states must believe that they have a stake in
allied security operations.  They describe the Administration’s concept for the NATO
Response Force (NRF) as initially constructive, but they call into question the
Administration’s leadership and good faith.  French officials have contended that the
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Administration laid the NRF on the table, told other allies to supply the forces, then
stood aside.  One senior French official described the U.S. attitude as, “Europeans,
improve your forces, and we’ll use them” which he characterized as the “practice of
the toolbox.”40 In late 2004, however, the United States began to send more of its
own forces to participate in the NRF.
France and Britain are the only two European allies with flexible, mobile forces
that can sustain themselves long distances from their territories.  In the 1990s, France
began a multi-year effort to downsize and professionalize its military forces.
Smaller, more flexible units were created.  U.S. military officials say that French
forces have improved substantially in the past decade, and have a highly educated
and motivated officer corps.  NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)
General James Jones has said that “France probably has the military in Europe most
able to deploy to distant theaters.”     At the same time, U.S. military officials also say
that some problems persist in an overly centralized command structure, occasional
poor equipment maintenance, and minimal depth in some units.  
In addition to the 4,000 French troops in NATO peace operations in the Balkans,
France has 650 troops (out of a total force of 9,000) in the International Security
Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF).  In a non-NATO operation, France also has
approximately 200 special forces troops that have been fighting alongside U.S. troops
in Afghanistan since fall 2001 against Taliban and Al Qaeda remnants.41
France and the United States differ over some of the next steps to stabilize
Afghanistan.  While France supports a general NATO policy to bring the two
different commands in Afghanistan under a NATO flag, it believes that the two
missions there must not be confused.  Joined by Germany and Spain, the French
government believes that ISAF’s mission is to stabilize the country, while the U.S.-
led mission (Operation Enduring Freedom) has as its mission to fight the Taliban
and Al Qaeda.  The French government, in accord with a range of NATO
governments, does not believe the rules of the road in fighting terrorism have been
clearly agreed upon in the alliance, a perspective influenced by the scandal involving
U.S. forces at the prison in Abu Ghraib, Iraq.42
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Terrorism
Many U.S. and French officials believe that bilateral cooperation between the
United States and France in law-enforcement efforts to combat terrorism since
September 11 has been strong, but at the same time a range of political factors is
complicating the relationship.43  France has long experience in combating terrorism,
a tightly centralized system of law enforcement, and a far-reaching network that
gathers information on extremist groups.  Limits on resources and important social
and political issues sometimes affect elements of France’s anti-terrorism policies.
Unlike the United States, France uses its military as well as the police to ensure
domestic order (however, France has no equivalent of the U.S. National Guard,
which can be deployed in national crises).  The French military is in the midst of an
effort to modify its forces to be more effective in counter-terror efforts at home and
abroad.
Terrorism has an extensive history in France.  Since the 1960s, terrorists have
repeatedly struck French targets.  Since the late 1970s, France has captured a number
of members of the Basque terrorist group, the ETA, and extradited them to Spain.
In recent years, a violent Corsican separatist group has carried out assassinations and
bombings in France.  In the past half century, France has created a number of
intelligence agencies and specialized police forces to combat such groups, usually in
a successful manner.  In 1994, French police thwarted a hijacking at the Marseille
airport; terrorists had reportedly intended to crash the plane into the Eiffel Tower.
In a notable instance, in September 1995, an Algerian terrorist organization, the
Armed Islamic Group (GIA), carried out bombings in the Paris subway that killed a
number of French citizens.  The reaction of the French government, according to U.S.
and French officials, was swift, ruthless, and effective, and the bombings ceased.
Al Qaeda has carried out at least one successful attack against France.  On May
6, 2002, Al Qaeda operatives exploded a car bomb in Karachi, Pakistan, that killed
11 French naval personnel.  The French navy had sent men to Karachi as part of a
contract to supply submarines to the Pakistani government.44
France has taken several steps to increase existing efforts to combat terrorism
on its own soil.  On September 12, 2001, France revived an existing law enforcement
measure, Vigipirate, that enhances the ability of the government to ensure order.  The
government established Vigipirate in 1978; without legislative action, the
government may activate the system.  The system provides for greater surveillance
of public places, government authority to cancel holidays or public gatherings that
could be the target of terrorist attacks, the activation of elements of the military to
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secure infrastructure, and tighter security at airports, train stations, embassies,
religious institutions, nuclear sites, and other locations that may come under threat.
Upon activation of Vigipirate, the government called 35,000 personnel from the
police and military to enforce such measures, including 4,000 personnel assigned to
guard the Paris subway system.  Vigipirate is still in force, although not at the highest
level of alert.
Coordination has improved between the United States and France in counter-
terror policy since September 11.  The two governments exchange selective
intelligence information on terrorist movements and financing.  In January 2002, the
French and U.S. governments signed an agreement allowing the U.S. Customs
Service to send inspectors to the major port of Le Havre.  There, U.S. inspectors have
joined their French counterparts in inspecting sea cargo containers for the possible
presence of weapons of mass destruction intended for shipment to U.S. ports.45
Middle East Peace
France’s long, intertwined history with the Middle East influences its debate on
terrorism and its involvement in the region.  While the French government supports
key U.S. objectives in dismantling Al Qaeda, there is great political sensitivity in
France to any issue that involves the Muslim world.  A legacy of the French colonial
empire is the presence of 5 to 6 million Muslims, mostly North Africans, living in
France, a population that successive French governments have found difficult to
integrate into society.  There is tension in the French population between those of
Caucasian background and those of North African origin.  In a 2002 poll, 33% of
those contacted believed that North Africans “cannot be integrated” into French
society; 56% said that “there are too many immigrants in France.”46  Jean-Marie Le
Pen, the presidential candidate for the racist National Front in the 2002 elections,
appealed to such sentiments with an anti-crime platform that described “the suburbs,”
where most poor North Africans live, as a breeding ground for crime and terrorism.
President Chirac’s Gaullist Party and the leftist opposition have strongly condemned
such views.
France, along with the EU and all European countries bordering the
Mediterranean, views the Middle East as a neighboring region whose political
developments strongly affect European affairs.  For this reason, France takes a strong
interest in such issues as the Middle East peace process, terrorism, and Iraq.  These
issues immediately arouse a debate over sensitive social questions in France.
The Road Map.  French officials, and their counterparts in many EU states,
are privately extremely critical of the Bush Administration’s policy that, in their
view, unduly favors Israel and supports an aggressive Israeli policy towards the
Palestinians.  France, as an EU member, takes a strong interest in the “Road Map.”
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The EU, the United States, the U.N., and Russia developed  the Road Map as a plan
to encourage negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians that would lead to the
creation of a Palestinian state and an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  France
has urged the Palestinian Authority to prevent terrorist attacks against Israel, and
Israel to withdraw from settlements from Palestinian lands occupied during the 1967
war and to release political prisoners.47
French officials disagree with the Administration’s view that the Sharon
government, in using military force against the Palestinians, is striking a blow against
terrorism; in contrast, they believe that the Sharon government’s policy is fueling a
terrorist reaction throughout the Middle East.  After a meeting with the heads of state
of six other EU governments in November 2001, President Chirac said that the group
was unanimous in thinking that, while the Middle East conflict was not causing
terrorism, “it is true that it makes it easier and creates a climate that... is favorable to
Muslim extremists and fundamentalists, notably bin Laden.”48
France joined with other EU governments in criticizing the Bush
Administration’s April 2004 decision to back elements of Sharon’s plan to withdraw
from Gaza and at the same time claim settlements for Israel on the West Bank and
renounce the Palestinians’ right of return to Israel.  President Chirac has said that
while unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Gaza was a positive step, it should have been
done within the process of negotiations that should lead to the creation of a
Palestinian state.   He has also criticized the Israeli “security fence” because it
dispossesses Palestinian families of their property.49 
France and most other EU governments believe that the Bush Administration
has not worked with sufficient energy to persuade the Sharon government to
negotiate peace with the Palestinians, and that the Sharon government has worked
assiduously to undermine the Palestinian Authority. French officials assert that
failure to negotiate with the Palestinian Authority deprives it of influence with
Palestinians and encourages the ascendancy of extremist groups, such as Hamas.50
France has also been critical of elements of the Bush Administration’s desire to
promote democracy in the Middle East.  In January 2005, former Foreign Minister
Michel Barnier criticized those who insist that there must be democracy in the region
before there can be peace in the Middle East.  He said that peace must come first as
“an objective precondition” for democracy and reform to take hold in the region.  In
this view, the effort by the Bush Administration to bring democracy to Iraq in order
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to inspire democratic development in the rest of the Middle East is the reverse of the
process that can bring reform.51
Some French observers believe that France, to protect its own interests in the
Middle East, must not become too closely associated with U.S. policies there, which
many Europeans see as having failed.  Such a view may explain in part French
opposition, and that of several other European governments, to Bush Administration
efforts to develop NATO operations in Iraq.52
Iraq
France participated in the U.S. led Gulf War of 1991, and for several years
supported the U.N. weapons inspections in Iraq.  France also supported a U.N.
resolution at the end of the Gulf War to prohibit the export of Iraqi oil until the
Hussein regime complied with an agreement to end its WMD program.
Controversy over the Oil-for-Food Program.  Over time, the United
States, France, and other countries became concerned that the oil embargo was
adversely affecting the conditions of the Iraqi people.  In 1996, to improve
humanitarian conditions in Iraq, the U.N. designed an “Oil-for-Food” program under
which Iraq might export sufficient oil to feed and provide general care for its people.
Almost from the beginning, there were allegations of corruption in the program.
There were charges, for example, that Saddam Hussein’s regime was demanding
kickbacks from countries obtaining contracts to sell food and equipment under the
program, and that the money was used to bribe public officials in other countries to
support Iraq’s cause, or to purchase illegal military equipment.  U.S. representatives
on the U.N. Sanctions Committee, which held oversight authority for granting
contracts, were able to block any contract.53
Under Oil-for-Food, Iraqi oil exports resumed, legally, on a scale sufficient to
provide humanitarian relief for the Iraqi people.  France imported oil from Iraq under
this program, with its highest level of imports reaching 171,000 barrels a day in 1998.
However, the United States was by a wide margin the largest importer of Iraqi oil in
the 1996-2001 period, purchasing approximately 60% of Iraqi exports.  France was
the fourth largest buyer of Iraqi oil, purchasing 8% of the crude exported by
Baghdad.54 In both the U.S. and French cases, the transactions were legal.
Some Members of Congress have questioned whether some governments,
including the French government, opposed the U.S. use of force against Iraq in the
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winter and spring of 2002-2003 out of concern that the overthrow of Hussein would
expose corrupt practices under the Oil-for-Food program.  In this view, “corruption
on this scale carries with it the potential to skew international decision-making.”  On
April 7, 2004, then U.S. ambassador to the U.N. John Negroponte  testified before
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that France, China, and Russia may have
been unwilling to impose stricter sanctions guidelines under the Oil-for-Food
program out of concern that such corruption might have been uncovered.  
Conversely, a  Department of Defense audit did not support the allegation that
the French government or French companies may have benefitted from the Oil-for-
Food program in any substantial way.  It found that 70% of the kickbacks and
overpricing involved companies from eight countries.  France was not named as one
of those countries, according to the audit.  The Duelfer report on WMD in Iraq
touched upon corruption in the Oil-for-Food program.  It did mention that “entities”
from Russia, China, and France may have received kickbacks from Iraq under the
program.  It listed French companies and individuals that may have received such
kickbacks.  The report acknowledged that several U.S. companies may also have
received kickbacks, but the report did not name them out of concern for “privacy.”
This statement led the French government to cry foul.  Why, it asked, did the report
name French entities but apply a different standard to U.S. companies?55
France has opened a judicial investigation of possible kickbacks to the oil
company Total.  Paris contends that there is no evidence that possible corruption
influences French policy. A former French ambassador to the U.N., Jean-Bernard
Mérimée, has been arrested and charged with having taken kickbacks from oil
companies that sold petroleum illegally to the Hussein regime.  Other French officials
are also under investigation by the government.56
An investigation is underway at the United Nations on corruption in the Oil-for-
Food program, to which France has reportedly supplied requested documents.  The
Bush Administration acknowledges that the French government fully supports the
investigation.  French officials have strongly denied any wrongdoing on the part of
their government, and say that the investigation should uncover whether any French
companies acted illegally.  The French ambassador to the United States has noted
that the U.S. government, having a seat on the U.N. Sanctions Committee, reviewed
all applications by French companies for contracts and had the authority to veto any
of them.  Some were in fact vetoed, on the basis that the contracts were for dual-use
items prohibited for import by Iraq.  According to one source, 93 of 184 contracts for
sale of dual-use items to Iraq by French companies were vetoed.57  It is unclear
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whether any contracts might have been vetoed out of concern over kickbacks, an
issue that may be resolved by the U.N. investigation.
The Iraq War of 2003.  During the late 1990s, the French government began
to distance itself from elements of U.S. policy in Iraq when the United States and
Britain resorted to occasional military force to persuade the Hussein regime to
comply with elements of the settlement that concluded the 1991 Gulf War.  U.N.
weapons inspectors left Iraq in 1998, when international will to enforce the
inspection regime weakened.  France, along with other governments, expressed
concern that living conditions in Iraq were deteriorating, and sought to lift
international sanctions against the Hussein regime.  Both the Clinton Administration
and the Bush Administration strongly opposed such a move. 
When the Bush Administration took office, it quickly raised the level of U.S.
criticism over Iraq’s opposition to U.N. inspections for weapons of mass destruction.
In fall 2002, after some hesitation, France backed the U.S. effort to reinstate U.N.
weapons inspections.  U.N. Resolution 1441 required Iraq to comply with the
inspections.  In late 2002 and early 2003, the Bush Administration stated that Iraq
was impeding the inspections and concealing WMD, and was thereby in “material
breach” of Resolution 1441.  In the Administration’s view, breach of the Resolution’s
requirements justified further action, including the possible use of military force, to
ensure compliance.  The French government, backed by Germany, which had joined
the U.N. Security Council in January 2003 as a rotating member, contended that
while Iraq was not in full compliance with Res. 1441, it was not yet in “material
breach” of the Resolution’s strictures.  The French government wished for the
inspections to continue, asserting that there was as yet no clear evidence that WMD
was being concealed.  Privately, some French officials were saying that Iraq likely
had concealed WMD, but that the inspections regime was sufficient to constrain
Saddam’s regime.58
A crucial period in the U.S.-French dispute over Iraq came in February and
March 2003.  In February 2003 the Administration circulated drafts of a resolution
at the U.N. that would have permitted military action against Iraq.  While the U.N.
Security Council had agreed to inspections for WMD, the Administration began to
add additional ideas.  Administration officials called for “regime change” in Iraq, and
the establishment of a democracy that would serve as a model and a spur for new
representative governments throughout the Middle East.  France and other
governments balked at these added objectives, asserting  that sustainable reforms in
Iraq and elsewhere could not be imposed by others.
The Administration also asked that NATO begin planning to provide Turkey
with defensive systems in the event of an attack by Iraq in an impending conflict.  In
addition, the request asked that NATO members backfill for some U.S. forces in the
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Balkans, that might be needed in the event of conflict with Iraq.  France, Germany,
and Belgium, objected in the North Atlantic Council (NAC), NATO’s supreme
political body.  They contended that granting the request would be the equivalent of
acknowledging that Iraq had impeded U.N. weapons inspections, as yet unproven in
the view of the three governments, and be a pretext for war.  Ultimately, the German
and Belgian governments relented, and France agreed that the decision to aid Turkey
could be taken in another NATO body where Paris is not a member.  The result in
late February 2003 was a decision to provide defensive assistance to Turkey.  This
dispute generated calls in Congress that NATO decision-making be altered to exclude
France, and fueled a popular barrage of U.S. criticism  against France and several
other allies.  Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld began to refer to a “new” Europe of
countries that supported the U.S. position on Iraq, and an “old” Europe of countries
such as France and Germany that opposed U.S. policy.59
However, France and Germany would not relent in their opposition to the
Administration’s draft U.N. resolution authorizing the possible use of force against
Iraq.  France and Russia, each holding a veto, threatened to use it if the resolution
were submitted to a vote.  Then foreign minister de Villepin said, “We think that a
military intervention would be the worst solution and that a recourse to force should
be the last path....”  He added that only the U.N. could authorize an invasion.60
In March 2003, the Bush Administration decided to go to war in Iraq without
a new U.N. resolution.  Several key allies, led by France and Germany, with indirect
support from Turkey, opposed the decision.  Other allies, led by Britain, Italy,
Poland, and Spain, backed the Administration.
U.S. forces overthrew Saddam Hussein’s regime in April 2003. The
Administration has sought to gather an international coalition to stabilize Iraq. France
put forward requirements to be fulfilled before Paris would provide military forces
or other forms of assistance in Iraq.  The French government criticized the U.S.
description of the coalition’s presence in Iraq as an “occupation,” without a detailed
plan and timetable for ending the occupation and turning sovereignty over to the Iraqi
people.  In September 2003, Chirac said, “It is very difficult for the Iraqis to accept
a situation which, in one way or another, is one of occupation.  The situation can only
deteriorate.”61  De Villepin called for “a rapid transfer of sovereignty....”  The answer
to the problems in Iraq is not more troops, he continued, but a “true provisional
government whose legitimacy will be underpinned by the U.N. and will benefit from
the support of the countries of the region.”  There must be, in the French view, he
continued, a U.N. resolution that would endorse such an arrangement.62
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In fall 2003, the situation in Iraq began to deteriorate, under the impetus of a
gathering insurgency.  Diplomatic efforts at the U.N. and in the alliance to develop
more support for U.S. policy in Iraq continued.  In December 2003, then Deputy
Defense Secretary Wolfowitz issued an order stating that governments not involved
in the coalition in Iraq would see their companies excluded from competition for
contracts to rebuild the country, a step that he described as being “necessary for the
protection of the essential security interests of the United States....”63  
Simultaneously, the Administration asked France and Germany, two
governments excluded from such competition, to agree to restructure their debt with
Iraq.  France accepted a U.S.-German compromise plan negotiated in the context of
the Paris Club to write off 80% of Iraq’s foreign debt; this percentage is higher than
the 50% of debt forgiveness that Paris had advocated, although it falls short of
original U.S. requests for nearly complete debt forgiveness for Iraq.  In France’s
view, Iraq retains the potential for great wealth from its petroleum resources, and
other, poorer countries would more clearly benefit from debt forgiveness.  Iraq owes
France $3 billion, Germany $2.4 billion, and the United States $2 billion.64
The French government has refused to send forces to be part of the U.S.-led
multinational force in Iraq.  French officials say that Paris did not approve the
conditions under which the United States launched the war and does not wish to be
associated with the occupation of Iraq.  At the NATO summit in June 2004, France
and  several other allies initially opposed sending a NATO force to Iraq.   Chirac said
that “any involvement of NATO in [the Middle East] seems to us to carry great risks,
including the risk of confrontation of the Christian West against the Muslim East.”
Ultimately, all allies agreed upon a training mission, but some countries do not wish
to send their forces to Iraq to train Iraqi security forces. France was one of these
countries, but has offered to train Iraqi police in metropolitan France.65
Trade66
U.S. commercial ties with France are extensive, mutually profitable, and
growing.  With over $1 billion in commercial transactions taking place between the
two countries every day of the year, each country has an increasingly large stake in
the health and openness of the other’s economy.  
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France is the ninth largest merchandise trading partner for the United States and
the United States is France’s largest trading partner outside the European Union.  In
2005, 60% or $32.5 billion of bilateral trade occurred in major industries such as
aerospace, pharmaceuticals, medical and scientific equipment, electrical machinery,
and plastics where both countries export and import similar products.  Many of these
products are components or capital goods used in the production of finished products
in both the United States and France.
The United States and France also have a large and growing trade in services
such as tourism, education, finance, insurance and other professional services.  In
2004,  France was the sixth largest market for U.S. exports of services and the
seventh largest provider of services to the United States.
While trade in goods and services receives most of the attention in terms of the
commercial relationship, foreign direct investment and the activities of foreign
affiliates can be viewed as the backbone of the commercial relationship.  The scale
of sales of U.S.-owned companies operating in France and French-owned companies
operating in the United States outweighs trade transactions by  a factor of almost
five.
In 2004 France was the sixth largest host country for U.S. foreign direct
investment abroad and the United States with investments valued at $58.9 billion
(historical cost basis) was the number one foreign investor in France.  During that
same year, French companies had direct investments in the United States totaling
$148.2 billion (historical cost basis), making France the fifth  largest investor in the
United States.  French-owned companies employed some 500,000 workers in the
United States in 2003 compared to 591,000 employees of U.S. companies invested
in France.
Most U.S. trade and investment transactions with France, dominated by
multinational companies, are non-controversial.  Nevertheless, three prominent issues
 — agriculture, government intervention in corporate activity, and the war in Iraq —
have contributed to increased bilateral tensions in recent years. 
Agriculture.  Agricultural trade disputes historically have been the major
sticking point in U.S.-France commercial relations.  Although the agricultural sector
accounts for a declining percentage of output and employment in both countries, it
has produced a disproportionate amount of trade tensions between the two sides.  As
trade is under the jurisdiction of the European Commission, the problems, of course,
are not technically bilateral in nature.
From the U.S. perspective, the restrictive trade regime set up by the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP) has been the real villain.  It has been a longstanding U.S.
contention that the CAP is the largest single distortion of global agricultural trade.
American farmers and policymakers have complained over the years that U.S. sales
and profits are adversely affected by (1) EU restrictions on market access that have
protected the European market for European farmers; by (2) EU export subsidies that
have deflated U.S. sales to third markets; and by (3) EU domestic income support
programs that have kept non-competitive European farmers in business.
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France’s agricultural sector, which in terms of output and land is the largest in
Europe, has long been the biggest beneficiary of the CAP.  Over the past several
years,  French farmers have received about 20-25 percent of CAP outlays that have
averaged around $40 billion.67  Acting to continue benefits and subsidies for its
farmers, the French position can determine the limits and parameters of the European
Commission’s negotiating flexibility on a range of agricultural issues that are of keen
interest to the United States.  The most prominent and perhaps important example
relates to current efforts to get the WTO Doha round of multilateral trade
negotiations back on track by reducing agricultural subsidies. While the European
Commission on May 10, 2004 offered to eliminate $3.3 billion in export subsidies,
François Loos, the French trade minister, and some officials from other European
governments, balked on the grounds that the commission had exceeded its mandate.68
Other examples where the French position arguably has made settlement of disputes
more difficult include expanded trademark protection for wines, cheeses, and other
food products linked to specific regions, and a ban on the importation of beef treated
with hormones.69 
Government Intervention in Corporate Activity.  Despite significant
reform and privatization over the past 15 years, the center-right French government
continues to play a larger role in influencing corporate activity than does the U.S.
government. This difference is manifested not only in the French government’s
continuing direct control of key companies, but also in its continuing proclivity to
influence mergers involving French firms.  Nevertheless, although bilateral disputes
may be more prone to occur because of the French government’s interventionist
tendencies,  the dictates of EU laws as well as the urgent need to raise the revenues
that accompany privatization efforts, are weakening the French dirigiste tradition.
In 1997 the socialist government of France restarted a process of privatization
and opening of government-controlled firms to private investment that had begun in
the 1980s, and the program has been continued by the center-right government that
took power in 2002. In 2003 and 2004, the government reduced its stakes in large
companies such as Air France-KLM (to 44.6 from 54.0 percent), France Telecom (to
42.2 from 54.5 percent), Renault (to 15.6 from 26.0 percent), and Thomson (to 2.0
from 20.8 percent).  The government still has stakes in Bull and Safran, and in 1,280
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other firms. But it has stated its intention to continue privatization, based largely on
the same criteria the Socialists had used.70
Despite its  privatization program, the French government continues to promote
national champions and “economic patriotism,” a concept that has been used to
justify opposition to foreign takeovers of French firms. This tendency has been
apparent in an effort by the government to strengthen a French takeover law  and a
parallel effort to scrutinize sensitive foreign investments more closely.  In
implementing the EU’s Takeover Directive in 2005, France’s National Assembly
adopted provisions that would allow French companies to ignore their shareholders
when trying to mount a defense against a takeover bid by a U.S. firm.  This action
came just months after Pepsi, a U.S. company, was rumored to be preparing a
takeover bid for Danone, the French food and beverage company.71
Foreign Policy Discord.  In the era of the Cold War, there was considerable
concern that trade disputes between allies could undermine political and security ties.
Deep differences over the Iraq war between the United States and many of its allies,
particularly France and Germany, reversed this Cold War concern into whether
foreign policy disputes can weaken or undermine strong commercial ties.  
Specific concerns that divisions over Iraq could spill over into the trade arena
arose in early 2003 with reports of U.S. consumer boycotts of French goods and calls
from some U.S. lawmakers for  trade retaliation against France (and Germany).  The
spike in bilateral tensions and hard feelings, however,  appears not to have had much
impact on sales of the products — such as wines, perfumes, handbags, and cheeses
  — most prone to being boycotted.72 U.S. imports of three of the four categories of
French products (perfumes and toiletries, travel goods and handbags, and cheese and
curds) increased in absolute terms from 2003 to 2005.  While cheese and curd
imports increased by 22% in 2004/03, sales fell by nearly 6% in the 2005/04 time
period.  As the value of the dollar vis-a-vis the euro grew weaker during this time
frame, it appears that U.S. demand for these products has remained strong. 
Although there are few signs that goods and services clearly identified with
France or the United States are being boycotted, some polls have found evidence of
public support among some segments of the U.S. population for expressing
opposition to foreign policy disagreements in the shopping malls.  Nevertheless, a
substantial  economic backlash appears unlikely due to the high degree of economic
integration.  Effective boycotts would jeopardize thousands of jobs on both sides of
the Atlantic.
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Assessment
The United States and France retain a strong measure of economic and  political
interdependence.  In economic terms, some $360 billion in annual commercial
transactions,  the vast majority due to sales by U.S. companies producing and selling
in France and French companies producing and selling in the United States, serves
as a strong form of economic glue that binds the two countries together. This deep
and growing level of economic integration increases the stakes each country has in
the vitality and openness of each other’s economy, as well as works as a
counterweight to the adoption of restrictive policies which could jeopardize hundreds
of thousands of jobs in both countries.  In political terms, France acknowledges the
security that only U.S. forces can provide on a global scale, evident in the conflict
against terrorism and the post-September 11 campaign to overthrow the Taliban and
weaken Al Qaeda.  The United States also plays a key institutional role in stabilizing
Europe, a measure of which is Washington’s leadership in enlarging NATO.
Additionally, France does act to buttress U.S. international efforts and to lend
legitimacy to Washington’s foreign policy initiatives, measures that demonstrate a
complementarity of interests and action that is still the norm, even if at times that
norm appears to be diminishing.  French forces fought in the Gulf War of 1991, and,
with much greater ability, in the Kosovo conflict of 1999.  France has followed
important U.S. initiatives that seek to enhance global stability, as in NATO’s
eventual acceptance of the once controversial idea that NATO go “out of area,” and
act on a global scale.  In the conflict against terrorism, France has supplied the Bush
Administration with political contacts in countries, such as Algeria and Tunisia, that
have proven valuable.73  With other EU countries, France has worked closely with
the United States in law enforcement efforts to combat terrorism.
Important divergences have emerged over the past decade.  The belief in France
that the United States at times acts “unilaterally” was already evident in the 1990s
when the French government criticized Congress and the Clinton Administration for
defeat of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, sanctions against Cuba, and a program
of national missile defense.74  This belief has sharpened during the current Bush
Administration, due to its rejection of the Kyoto Treaty, its criticism of the
International Criminal Court, and its Iraq policy.  French public opinion has grown
increasingly critical of the United States since late 2002.  In October 2001, shortly
after the terrorist attacks on the United States, 67% of those polled had a favorable
opinion of the United States; in June 2005, that figure had slipped to 31%.  In
October 2001, 53% of those polled had “confidence in the United States to deal
responsibly with world affairs;” by May 2004, that figure had fallen to 13%.75
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The French view of the United States is complex.  While the French people
view the United States as the sole superpower, the French media often describe the
United States as having feet of clay.  Hurricane Katrina fueled this sentiment. The
French media was both puzzled by and critical of the U.S. government’s seeming
initial inability to assist Katrina’s stream of refugees and to remove the dead from the
streets.  Katrina also led to an outpouring of generous support from France, both in
terms of the governmental emergency supplies and private and NGO giving.76
France’s belief in the importance of international institutions is deeply
ingrained, a sentiment shared not only by such traditional U.S. allies as Germany and
Britain, but learned and accepted as well by the democracies that have emerged from
the Warsaw Pact.  The United States is in part responsible for this belief.  After the
Second World War, Washington strongly urged acceptance of international
institutions to resolve disputes and manage global financial and economic systems.
Since the end of the Cold War, a centerpiece of the policy of three U.S.
Administrations has been that central European governments should join NATO, the
European Union, and other institutions as a means to ensure stability through closer
consultation, joint decision-making, and development of interdependence.  Many
European governments have embraced these institutions as an antidote to the
conflicts of the 20th century.
The continuing controversy over Iraq illustrates the divergence between the
United States and France over the use of international institutions and military force.
Regarding the former, President Bush challenged the U.N. in fall 2002 to meet its
responsibilities and enforce the U.N. prohibition on weapons of mass destruction in
Iraq.  He noted that the difficult tasks undertaken by the U.N., such as those
involving the threat or use of military force and the consequent expending of
resources, often fell to major governments, such as the United States.  The French
government, and other allies, were ultimately sympathetic to this argument, and
backed a new effort to enforce inspections. When the Bush Administration began to
criticize the inspections regime as insufficient several weeks after its inception,
France, joined by Germany and several other allies, asked for time, and noted
privately that it was Washington, after all, that was supplying much of the
information to the U.N. for site inspections. They wished to allow the inspections to
run their course.  French officials also feared that war in Iraq could trigger unintended
consequences, such as prolonged conflict or destabilization of neighboring regions,
and an expansion of global terrorism.77
Differences over Iraq also threatened in early 2003 to disrupt commercial ties
with reports of U.S. consumer boycotts of French goods.  U.S. companies too
worried that French and other European consumers might not buy their products as
a way of expressing opposition to U.S. policy. Despite public opinion surveys
indicating some support for using the marketplace to demonstrate political
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dissatisfaction,  there is little evidence that sales so far have been adversely affected
due to the foreign policy discord on either side of the Atlantic.  
A complementarity of interests and action in many spheres is likely to continue.
For those in Congress and in the executive branch who desire greater European
burdensharing in the alliance, ESDP holds at least the possibility of greater military
capability among continental allies, a capability that could be used by NATO for
conflicts in the region, or in more distant theaters.  For those who desire greater
contributions by other countries in peacekeeping, or in international financial
institutions, French influence and policy often buttress U.S. interests and diminish
the need for greater expenditure of U.S. resources.  And for those who desire to
maintain an open world trading system, the French support in the councils of the
European Union and World Trade Organization is sometimes critical.
Finally, France and the United States, while sharing values inherent in most
democratic societies, will likely continue to have different political perspectives,
particularly over the role of international institutions and the use of force.  French
efforts to build a politically strengthened EU and an effective ESDP could reduce the
U.S. role and influence on the continent.  Some critics of France have interpreted
instances of disagreement as a desire on the part of France to see the United States
fail.  However, failure of the United States in areas of foreign affairs would have
direct implications for France and other European countries.  In Iraq, failure of the
U.S. effort to bring stability, for example, has potentially great negative consequences
for all Europeans: further disaffection with U.S. leadership of NATO; a renewal of
radical Islam in the Middle East, with regimes hostile to western governments; and
further exacerbation of tensions in the Middle East, with unwanted consequences on
the European continent.
